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In its periodic declarations of domestic support to the WTO, the EU has progressively 
reduced its amber-box declarations in line with its changing system of farm support. 
Surprisingly, however, in 2007/08 it managed to more than halve its amber box 
compared with that of the previous year, easily achieving the reduction targets being 
touted in the Doha Round. This was largely due to a change in the calculations for 
fresh fruits and vegetables. These had been linked to the entry price system, which was 
not affected by the 2008 fruit and vegetables reform. Why the EU chose to make this 
change during the ongoing Doha Round negotiations remains unclear.    
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n January 2011 the European Union notified the World Trade Organization of the 
support given to its agriculture in 2007/08 (WTO, 2011a). The WTO’s domestic 
support commitments, established in the context of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (URAA), are frequently referred to as the amber, blue and green boxes; 
and as a result of policy changes pursued by the EU since the early 1990s, the 
common agricultural policy’s (CAP) colour scheme has changed markedly. This trend, 
unexpectedly, was reflected in the EU’s 2007/08 declaration; but somewhat 
surprisingly the EU managed to halve the contents of its amber box between 2006/07 
and 2007/08, from €26.6 to €12.4 billion. This was partly the consequence of a paring 
of its estimates for butter and sugar, and of the de minimis rule for maize and wine. 
But in particular, as measured by the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), 
amber-box support to fresh fruits and vegetables virtually disappeared. Consequently, 
the EU’s Current Total AMS for 2007/08, at 17 percent of its AMS ceiling (its Bound 
Total AMS), signalled that no further policy changes would be necessary for the EU to 
accept a 70 percent reduction in its AMS ceiling in the context of the ongoing Doha 
Round of international trade negotiations. 
This article’s objectives are to set out the circumstances of that outcome and 
explore the EU’s motives. Accordingly, it proceeds as follows. First it recalls the 
changing colour of the EU’s domestic support declarations from 1995 to 2008, before 
examining the 2007/08 declaration. Then it outlines the EU’s AMS calculations for 
fresh fruits and vegetables prior to 2007/08, before showing how this linked in with its 
entry price system, and discussing the somewhat arbitrary nature of the AMS 
calculation. Changes in the EU’s support regime for fresh fruits and vegetables in the 
1996 and 2008 reforms are then outlined, but it is the 2008 reform that would appear 
to be the EU’s justification for its changed practice. Finally, in a concluding section, 
the article asks why the EU chose to make this change at this stage in the Doha 
Round. 
The EU’s Domestic Support Notifications, 1995/96–
2007/08 
igure 1 summarises the EU’s declarations on domestic support commitments 
from 1995/96 to 2007/08. The MacSharry reforms, decided in May 1992, 
partially replaced market price support with area and headage payments that were then 
declared as blue-box support. The Agenda 2000 reforms, agreed in March 1999, 
resulted in a further tranche of amber-box support turning blue. 
The second major change resulted from the Fischler reforms of 2003 (largely 
enacted from 2005), which were then extended to more product sectors in subsequent 
years. Direct payments – in particular the area and headage payments of the 
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MacSharry reforms – were switched into a new Single Payment Scheme (SPS), 
pushing blue-box expenditures into the green box. Other policy initiatives – the sugar 
reform in November 2005 for example – began switching amber-box support into the 
green box; but a number of changes, for example those stemming from the Health 
Check agreed in November 2008, have yet to be fully reflected in the declarations 
(Cunha with Swinbank, 2011, chapter 9). 
In its 2007/08 declaration the EU declared €31.3 billion of “decoupled income 
support” – in essence, the SPS – in the green box (WTO, 2011a, 4). Clearly figure 1 
would look rather different if this €31.3 billion had been reported as blue- or amber-
box support, jeopardising the EU’s ability to abide by any tighter constraints imposed 
by a Doha agreement. On the basis of the December 2008 draft modalities, Josling 
and Swinbank (2011, 90) report a likely post-Doha Bound Total AMS of €21.7 billion 
for the EU, a blue-box limit of €6.5 billion, and a new overall constraint – on its 
OTDS: Overall Trade Distorting Support – of €23.8 billion. Thus the green-box status 
of the SPS is a crucial plank in the EU’s Doha strategy. Whether the SPS is a genuine 
green-box policy is a question beyond the scope of the present article (but see 




























Current Total AMS Total de minimis Blue Box
Green Box Bound Total AMS
Source: EU’s declarations in the WTO’s document series G/AG/N/EEC/ 
Figure 1  The EU’s domestic support declarations to the WTO (ecu/€ million). Alan Swinbank 
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The 2007/08 AMS Declaration 
he differences between the EU’s 2006/07 AMS declaration, at €26.6 billion, and 
that of 2007/08 at €12.4 billion, are readily apparent from table 1. Cereals, sugar, 
butter and wine account for part of the decrease, but the largest reduction is that for 
fresh fruits and vegetables, clearly requiring further explanation. 
For cereals the reduction is basically due to the AMS for maize in 2007/08, which 
had been calculated at €450 million, falling out of the total due to the de minimis rule. 
This is an either-or rule. If support accounts for less than 5 percent of the value of 
production, then the AMS is reported as zero. If, however, it amounts to 5 percent or 
more, then the full value becomes part of the Current Total AMS. Largely as a result 
of a sharp increase in the value of production, the maize AMS fell to 4.8 percent of the 
value of production in 2007/08. For wine, however, the de minimis rule was largely 
triggered by a fall in its AMS to €608 million, some 3.8 percent of the value of 
production. In 2006/07 it stood at 5.8 percent of the value of production. Conclusion 
of the Doha Round was expected to see the trigger reduced to 2.5 percent of the value 
of production. One product for which there was no possibility of the de minimis rule 
being triggered was tobacco, with its AMS amounting to 86 percent of the value of 
production. 
Table 1  Summary Comparison of the EU’s 2006/07 and 2007/08 Current Total AMS 
Notifications (€ million) 
  2006/07 2007/08 
All cereals  4,535.2 3,980.6
Sugar 6,766.5 3,550.3




Apples  2,651.9 0.0
Tomatoes  2,149.2 0.0
All other fresh fruit & vegetables  3,923.0 1.7
All processed fruit & vegetables  610.8 508.0
All other products  215.1 209.4
 26,632.3 12,354.2
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Reductions in the AMSs for butter and sugar reflect, in part, policy reform, and 
the consequential decrease in the “applied administered price” that the EU uses to 
determine market price support. The Fischler reform resulted in a 25 percent cut in the 
intervention price (now renamed the reference price) for butter, in four steps, the last 
effective in 2007. Although intervention prices were fixed, buying-in to intervention 
was actually by a tender mechanism, with the European Commission fixing the 
buying-in price at not less than 90 percent of the intervention price. Then in 
September 2007 the system was simplified, and intervention agencies were authorised 
to buy butter at 90 percent of the intervention price (European Commission, 2007b). 
Up until 2006/07 the EU used the unabated intervention price as the applied 
administered price, but in 2007/08 changed its practice and used 90 percent of the 
intervention/reference price (reflecting, presumably, the minor policy change enacted). 
Thus the 2007/08 “applied administered price” has had two reductions applied 
compared to that for 2006/07: the final cut from the Fischler reform, and a belated 
recognition that buying-in takes place at 90 percent of the intervention price. 
This shaving of the applied administered price also extended to sugar. Its “applied 
administered price” fell from €631.9 per tonne in 2006/07, equal to the then 
intervention/reference price, to €433.2 in 2007/08, largely accounting for the sharp 
fall in the sugar AMS. But what explains the figure of 433.2? The sugar reform of 
2005 ushered in a number of changes, including a significant reduction in support 
prices through to 2009 and a phasing out of intervention buying. On a temporary basis 
intervention was available at 80 percent of the following marketing year’s reference 
price.
1 Thus the €433.2 is 80 percent of the 2008/09 reference price of €541.5 per 
tonne. Consequently an “applied administered price” of €323.5 is to be expected in the 
2008/09 AMS calculation. With unchanged production this will further reduce the 
sugar AMS, pushing it down to €1.9 billion. 
The AMSs for Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
or both the base period and each subsequent annual notification through to 
2006/07, the EU calculated an “Equivalent Measurement of Support” for 16 fresh 
fruits and vegetables that had been subject to the EU’s reference price system (a 
forerunner of the current entry price system, introduced below). The details are set out 
in the technical annex to this article. The total reported for the base period was 8.7 
billion ecu, compared to a Total AMS, over all products, of 73.5 billion ecu (i.e., 11.9 
percent of the total). In 2006/07, the last year in which the EU calculated its AMSs for 
fresh fruits and vegetables in this way, the €8.6 billion reported represented 32.3 
percent of the EU27’s declared Current Total AMS for the year. In the intervening 
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years, as in the base period and 2006/07, apples and tomatoes dominated. The basic 






There were three variables in the calculation: 
•  first, the volume of production eligible for price support. This varied from 
year to year, but EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007 did not dramatically 
change these numbers. 
•  second, the applied administered price. This was the same as the entry price, 
and reduced over time, but not by as much as 20 percent, the rate at which 
many of the EU’s tariffs for fresh fruits and vegetables were reduced in 
accordance with the URAA. Later we explain why this has been the case. 
•  and third, the products subject to an applied administered price (i.e., the entry 
price system). Cabbage lettuce, endives (chicory) and aubergines were subject 
to reference prices through to the 1994/95 marketing year but were excluded 
from the entry price system, and curiously they did not form part of the EU’s 
Total AMS calculations for the base period (Swinbank and Ritson, 1995, 349). 
The fourth element, the external price, remained unchanged throughout, as in all AMS 
calculations. 
Reference Prices, Entry Prices and Maximum Tariff 
Equivalents  
he EU’s import protection for fresh fruits and vegetables consists of an ad 
valorem tariff (which often varies on a seasonal basis) plus – for the 16 fresh 
fruits and vegetables discussed in this article – a minimum import price regime. 
Reference prices were the original minimum import prices. If imported products 
were found on sale on the EU’s internal market at prices below a specified wholesale 
price (in effect determined by the reference price), then subsequent shipments of that 
product from that country of origin were penalised by levying what was referred to as 
a countervailing charge.
2 This applied until: i) market prices rose so that the reference 
price was respected; ii) shipments ceased; or iii) the period of applicability of 
reference prices came to an end (Swinbank and Ritson, 1995). Reference prices might 
apply all year round (as with apples and lemons), or only for part of the year, and 
could vary seasonally. 
T
AMS =  
volume of production eligible for support 
multiplied by 
(Applied Administered Price – External Price) Alan Swinbank 
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Under the URAA, WTO members were obliged to tariffy their non-tariff barriers 
and then reduce all tariffs by 36 percent on average. The EU chose to replace one 
minimum import price regime (reference prices) by another (entry prices), at broadly 
the same minimum import price level (Swinbank and Ritson, 1995, give more details), 
but to be applied at the time of import, and not retrospectively. In effect the 
countervailing charge, from the old reference price regime, was converted into a 
maximum tariff equivalent (expressed in ecu, later euro, per tonne): the maximum 
additional tariff that the EU could apply under the post-1995 regime if shipments were 
offered at less than the entry price. 
By way of example, prior to the Uruguay Round the EU’s MFN tariff on sweet 
oranges ranged from 4.0 percent during the EU’s off-season to 20 percent in its main 
production season. The EU committed to a 20 percent reduction in its tariff over the 
URAA’s six-year implementation period (European Communities, 1994a). In addition, 
from 1 December to 31 May, an entry price (at a flat rate of 372 ecu/tonne) was to 
apply. This entry price of 372 ecu/tonne also served as the applied administered price 
for sweet oranges for the base period AMS calculation (as detailed in the technical 
annex to this article). Note then that the applied administered prices used for the base 
period AMS calculations were not the minimum import prices of the historic base 
period 1986-88, but rather the newly established entry prices for the post-1995 trade 
regime. 
If the entry price was not respected, then an additional duty (the maximum tariff 
equivalent) of up to 89 ecu/tonne could be applied; but this too reduced by 20 percent 
over the six-year implementation period. The maximum tariff equivalent (of 89 
ecu/tonne) was the arithmetical difference between a so-called external price for 1986-
88, of 283 ecu/tonne, and the entry price (372), and the same is true for the other 15 
external prices in the AMS calculations, allowing for some arithmetical oddities.
3 
The applied administered price (aka the entry price) for sweet oranges was 
reduced by 18 ecu, from 372 ecu/tonne in the base period to a final rate of 354 
ecu/tonne (i.e., by 20 percent) (and similarly for the other 15 products, allowing for a 
few arithmetical oddities). Thus a 20 percent reduction in the maximum tariff 
equivalent, in this instance, translated into a 4.8 percent fall in both the entry price and 
the applied administered price (but, because the maximum tariff equivalent is the unit 
rate AMS, a 20 percent cut in the AMS). 
Although the new entry prices were derived from the old reference prices, not all 
the transcriptions were straightforward (Swinbank and Ritson, 1995, provide details). 
Figure 2 shows the base entry prices (i.e., before the URAA reductions) for tomatoes 
over a full 12-month period. It will be noted that the entry price for this product (and Alan Swinbank 
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for others) varies through the year, with a peak of 1,200 ecu/tonne in April. This 
“peak” entry price, combined with an external reference price of 828 ecu/tonne (also 
shown in figure 2), produced the AMS for tomatoes, even though it was only valid for 
one month a year, and the external reference price exceeded the entry price for more 
than half the year. Moreover, this April “peak” was only introduced in early 1994, 
prior to the Marrakesh meeting. An unpublished document of December 1993 listed 
an entry price of 920 ecu/tonne for the entire period 1 January to 30 April, with a 
maximum tariff equivalent of 92 ecu/tonne (Swinbank and Ritson, 1995, 352). Clearly 
had this last-minute change not been made, the AMS for tomatoes would have been 
much smaller. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the AMS for tomatoes does 
seem to have been a rather arbitrary construct. 
Sources: entry price: European Communities (1994a), Code 0702;  
external price: European Communities (1994b, supporting table 9). 
Figure 2  Base entry price for tomatoes (ecu/tonne) before URAA reductions. 
A Doha agreement would undoubtedly lead to a sharp reduction in import tariffs, 
including – presumably – the maximum tariff equivalents on entry price products. In 
the URAA the 20 percent cut in tariffs on these products was reflected in a 20 percent 
cut in both the ad valorem tariff and the maximum tariff equivalent, and consequently 
in the AMS. Thus a 70 percent reduction in the tariff, in the Doha Round, would have 
resulted in a 70 percent reduction in the AMSs for these 16 products, had the EU not 
already set them at zero. 
These reductions in the maximum tariff equivalent will translate, on a euro for 
euro basis, into a direct reduction in the entry price. This, together with the inflation 
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on some products redundant; but for the moment they still remain in force. Academics 
still study their protective effect, whilst some lobby groups complain about the lack of 
border protection. In response to one such complaint, the European Commission in 
September 2010 commented that, “… taking into account the sensitivity of the EPS 
[entry price system] in the context of WTO negotiations, the Commission has made 
clear its intention to postpone the discussion on the review of the system until the 
conclusion of the Doha Round. Thus, no change of the EPS has been pursued so far.” 
However it went on to note that, given “the current state and perspectives for a 
conclusion of the Doha Round”, it might be appropriate to reconsider its stance (in 
European Parliament, 2010, 3). 
Reform of the Fruit and Vegetables Regime 
f the entry price system remains in force, on what pretext did the European 
Commission change its AMS calculations for these 16 fresh fruits and vegetables 
for the 2007/08 domestic support commitment declaration? On the same date (12 
January 2011) that it submitted its domestic support declaration, the EU also tabled a 
notification concerning “new or modified domestic support measures exempt from 
reduction”, the larger part of which concerned a “reform of the fruit and vegetables 
sector” applicable from 1 January 2008 (WTO, 2011a & 2011b). 
  According to the EU, this 2008 reform involved: 
•  integrating the fruit and vegetables sector into the Single Payment 
Scheme; 
•  encouraging growers to join producer organizations; 
•  abolishing export subsidies for fruit and vegetables; 
•  increasing EU funding for promotion and organic production; and 
•  requiring a minimum level of environmental spending (WTO, 2011b, 2). 
There is no mention of the entry price system in the document, nor any attempt to 
justify the major revisions it had made to its AMS calculations for fresh fruits and 
vegetables, and so it is unclear whether we should infer that the EU was suggesting 
that the 2008 reform validated the new practice. 
There were, nonetheless, two significant changes regarding the SPS and green-
box support (European Commission, 2007a). The first is that land on which fruit and 
vegetables are grown became eligible for the single payment. When the SPS was first 
formulated, the general rule was that fruits and vegetables could not be grown on land 
on which the single payment was being paid: a provision that seemed to endanger the 
green-box status of the SPS following the WTO Dispute Settlement Body’s ruling, in 
US–Upland Cotton, that a similar U.S. provision debarred its supposedly decoupled 
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payments from the green box (Swinbank and Tranter, 2005). Second, support for 
processed fruits and vegetables was decoupled over a phased transitional period, with 
new SPS entitlements created to the value of €800 million, which eventually will all 
fall within the green box (WTO, 2011b, 5). 
Although the role of producer organizations was modified by the 2008 reform, 
their function remained largely unchanged from that assumed in 1996, when the sector 
was last “reformed”. A distinctive feature of the support mechanisms for fresh fruits 
and vegetables prior to the 1996 reform was the extensive use of withdrawal, a form 
of intervention. Producer organizations were able to withdraw 11 products from the 
market and then claim financial compensation (at the withdrawal price) from the EU. 
Quite large quantities of produce could be withdrawn; but as the Court of Auditors 
(2006, 47) subsequently noted, “The reform of the fruit and vegetable policy in 1996 
limited the quantities of surplus produce that could be disposed of under the 
withdrawals aid scheme, and cut the compensation paid to growers for those 
withdrawals. The Commission data shows that this has resulted in a substantial 
reduction in the quantities of withdrawals within the EU aid scheme ….” It also 
reported that “producer organisations explained that the reduced aid rates for 
withdrawals phased in since 1996, together with increased controls, make it no longer 
worthwhile to claim the aid on their surplus production.” 
Discussion, Unanswered Questions and Concluding 
Comments 
wo overarching questions emerge from the earlier discussion: i) why did the EU 
calculate such large AMSs for fresh fruits and vegetables for the base period; and 
ii) why did the EU choose January 2011 as the moment to excise these large AMSs 
from its Current Total AMS? 
One possible explanation of the large AMSs for the base period is that they 
formed part of a European Commission/EU strategy to maximise its Bound Total 
AMS, to give it scope to secure significant cuts in the future. Given the 
interrelationship between the applied administered price and the entry price for these 
products, the 20 percent tariff cut the EU agreed to in the Uruguay Round resulted in a 
20 percent reduction in their AMSs, matching the requirement for domestic support 
reductions. By extension, a 70 percent cut in tariffs at the end of the Doha Round 
would have delivered a 70 percent cut in the AMSs. An alternative explanation, 
however, is that this was not part of a master plan, but the result of a decentralised 
procedure, with commodity specialists each trying to interpret the URAA to the best 
of their ability, and with relatively limited overall coordination. Maybe the archives at 
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some future date will shed light on this. For the moment, this author’s hunch is that 
the latter is more likely. 
Whatever the explanation, the resulting AMSs were rather odd, and somewhat 
arbitrary, as was seen over tomatoes. But they did give the EU future scope to reduce 
its Current Total AMS. 
Japan led the way. In its 1998 AMS submission it eliminated its AMS for rice, 
sharply reducing its Current Total AMS. Godo and Takahashi (2011, 176) explain that, 
in a 1998 policy guideline, the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries had “announced that government rice procurement should be limited to 
purchase of rice stocks for food security”, although there was no corresponding 
revision to the Staple Food Law. They point out that intervention in the rice market 
had become progressively less effective following policy changes in 1969, perhaps 
justifying the AMS change, but they comment that there was “not a clear-cut turning-
point year” that could readily be identified. The fragility of the concept of an applied 
administered price in AMS calculations was plain to see. Presumably other WTO 
members watched with interest: if it could be credibly claimed that the applied 
administered price had been abolished, then the corresponding AMS would fall away 
to zero. 
But why did the EU choose January 2011 to make this change? To some extent 
the date was probably accidental: it just happened to be when the European 
Commission made its domestic support commitment declaration for 2007/08. So a 
preliminary question might be: when did the European Commission decide to use the 
2008 “reform” of the fruit and vegetables regime to justify a change in its AMS 
submission? Had the plan already been hatched in 2008, or even earlier, with it then 
simply being a matter of waiting for the 2007/08 AMS declaration to be made; or did 
it emerge much later as the 2007/08 submission was being prepared? If the European 
Commission knew in 2008, this presumably made it easier to accept the proposed 70 
percent cut in the EU’s Bound Total AMS in the Doha draft modalities. If the EU’s 
Doha negotiators knew, did they share that information with the member states? And 
if other WTO members had known, might they not have demanded a larger reduction 
in the EU’s Bound Total AMS? Indeed, might they not do so now? 
In relation to the Doha negotiations, it does seem a little curious that the EU 
unilaterally conceded that its Bound Total AMS could be reduced by more than the 70 
percent reduction on the table before the negotiations were concluded and, moreover, 
that this had been achieved, seemingly, without any substantive policy change. This 
would not appear to have given the EU a negotiating advantage – others could now 
demand more – but it might have assuaged fears in the member states. If the latter, Alan Swinbank 
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there has – as yet – been little public attempt to explain to the farm lobby that the 
AMS reduction has already been achieved. 
Why did the EU not wait until the review of the entry price system had been 
concluded, in the wake of a Doha agreement? A reform of the entry price system, to 
comply with Doha, could have produced an AMS reduction after the event. Entry 
prices for many products are probably not protective, and could readily be abolished 
without major impact on the sector; and a Doha agreement in any event would reduce 
the level of entry prices (rendering them even less protective) and their associated 
AMSs. 
The 2008 reform of the fresh and processed fruit and vegetable regimes did 
produce notable outcomes in a WTO context. It allowed SPS payments to be made on 
land growing fruits and vegetables, removing one (but not necessarily all) of the 
possible concerns about the green-box compatibility of the SPS. And it began the 
process of decoupling the aids for processed fruits and vegetables, pushing support 
from the amber box to the green box. But it did not change the entry price system, and 
hence any claim that it eliminated the AMSs on these 16 fresh fruits and vegetables is 
contentious. 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  See articles 3 and 18 of Council Regulation (EC) No 318/2006 of 20 February 
2006 on the common organisation of the markets in the sugar sector, Official 
Journal of the European Union, L58, 28 February. 
2.  Article 25 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1035/72 of 18 May 1972 on the 
common organization of the market in fruit and vegetables, Official Journal of the 
European Communities, L118, 20 May. 
3.  Both the entry price and the external reference price had appeared as early as 1990 
in EU documents (European Communities, 1990). Apart from the entry price for 
tomatoes (and that for cucumbers), which is complicated because of the 
application of coefficients under the old reference price system that had to be 
applied depending upon whether the imported tomatoes were produced in the field 
or a greenhouse, all the other numbers remained unchanged. The EU said of the 
external reference price that it had “been calculated as a 1986 to 1988 average 
representative world market price or import price” (op. cit.: Annex IV, 2).  